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TOURO LAW REVIEW
retroactivity test adopted in Pepper for determining whether a
rule is to be applied retroactively. Federal law takes a rigid
approach and inquires only to whether the new rule is grounded
in federal principles and according to federal law. If the new rule
is based on federal constitutional concerns, then it is applied
retroactively without exception. However, New York's rule on
retroactivity takes a more practical approach and inquires not
only to what the purpose of the new rule is, but also as to its
practical effects upon the judicial system and the individuals who
may have relied upon the old rule.
It may be stated, and rightly so, that the factors articulated in
Pepper present the possibility that a rule which should be applied
retroactively will not be so applied because of its practical effect
on the administration of justice and the reliance upon it by the
defendants. This is perhaps a weakness, however, it provides a
degree of judicial discretion that is sometimes needed when the
rights of individuals are involved. The functional difference in
the two rules is that the state rule provides a means for
determining the degree of protection a defendant is entitled,
whereas the federal bright-line test relies on the constitutional
guarantees inherent in the Constitution and its amendments.
People v. Saurini295
(decided February 4, 1994)
Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence on the grounds that the warrantless entry onto his
property by deputy sheriffs violated his constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to both the
New York State Constitution296  and the United States
295. 201 A.D.2d 869, 607 N.Y.S.2d 518 (4th Dep't 1994).
296. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.... but upon probable cause .... " Id.
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Constitution.297 The People argued that the entry and seizure
were either justified under the plain view doctrine, 298 or the open
fields doctrine. 299 The Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
held that the motion to suppress should have been granted
because neither doctrine was applicable. 300
In Saurini, two deputy sheriffs entered the defendant's
neighbor's property with the neighbor's permission, and from
there viewed marijuana plants growing in defendant's
backyard. 301 The deputy sheriffs then entered defendant's
property and seized eighteen marijuana plants. 302 The plants had
been growing in a flower bed behind the defendant's home at a
distance ranging from eight inches to three feet from the house
297. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ... but upon probable cause .... " Id.
298. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993); People v.
Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1993). Essentially,
the plain view doctrine, as described in both of these cases, permits the
warrantless seizure of objects viewed in plain sight when the incriminating
character of the object is immediately apparent and the authorities are lawfully
situated to both make the viewing and access the object. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct.
at 2136-37; Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d at 110, 612 N.E.2d at 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
299. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (holding that
government entrance upon open fields is not an unreasonable search despite the
fact the owner has erected fences indicating an expectation of privacy). But see
People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
The New York Court of Appeals expressly rejected the holding in Oliver to the
extent that the Oliver court refused to distinguish between fields that the owner
sought to enclose and those that had no such enclosure. Id. at 478, 593 N.E.2d
at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922. In Scott, the court of appeals held that "where
landowners fence or post 'No Trespassing' signs on their private property or,
by some other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not permitted, the
expectation that their privacy rights will be respected and that they will be free
from unwarranted intrusions is reasonable." Id. at 491, 593 N.E.2d at 1338.
583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
300. Saurini, 201 A.D.2d at 870, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
301. Id. at 869, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
302. Id.
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and were enclosed in a flower bed with a rope attached to the
house. 303
The Saurini court rejected the People's argument that the
seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine. 304 Regarding
this claim, the New York Court of Appeals has stated that "[ilt is
fundamental that warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable unless they fall within one of the acknowledged
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." '305
The plain view doctrine is an exception that permits the
warrantless seizure of an object that is viewed in plain sight when
three conditions are met: 1) the person doing the viewing must be
lawfully positioned to view the object; 2) the person must
lawfully have access to the object; and 3) the incriminating nature
of the object must be immediately apparent. 306
In Saurini, although the deputies satisfied the first and third
requirements by being lawfully positioned to view the plants and
because their incriminating nature was immediately apparent,
they did not have lawful access to the plants when they seized
them. 307 What the deputies needed was a lawful means of gaining
access to the defendant's property and, as noted, the plain view
doctrine presupposes this factor, rather than supplying it. It has
been held that the plain view doctrine is an exception to the
warrant requirement for seizures, not searches, 308 it nevertheless
requires that the person conducting the seizure have prior
justification for being in a position from which he can seize the
303. Id.
304. Id. at 870, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
305. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d at 109, 612 N.E.2d at 300, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures includes
conversations over public telephones).
306. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136-37 (1993); Diaz,
81 N.Y.2d at 110, 612 N.E.2d at 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
307. Saurini, 201 A.D.2d at 870, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
308. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990) (stating that "[i]f
'plain view' justifies an exception from an otherwise applicable warrant
requirement . . . it must be an exception that is addressed to the concerns that
are implicated by seizures rather than by searches").
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object. 309 In this case, the problem lay in the entering onto the
defendant's property to seize the evidence. Thus, the plain view
doctrine was inapplicable because the deputies did not have
lawful access to the objects they seized. 310
The Saurini court then turned to the People's claim that the
entry and seizure was justified under the open fields doctrine.3 11
The open fields doctrine asserts that "the government's intrusion
upon the open fields is not one of those 'unreasonable searches'
proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment." 3 12 There are
two significant aspects to this doctrine. First, where does the
curtilage end and the open field begin?3 13 Second, once an area
has been defined as an open field rather than part of the curtilage,
what constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment?314 In Saurini, the court relied on cases that have
defined curtilage boundaries, finding the marijuana in question
was being grown within the curtilage because of its proximity to
the house and the rope enclosing it.3 15 However, had the court
309. See Dickerson; 113 S. Ct. at 2136-37; Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d at 110, 612
N.E.2d at 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
310. Saurini, 201 A.D.2d at 870, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
311. Id.
312. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
313. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (stating that a greenhouse
located ten to twenty feet behind a mobile home was within the curtilage);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that marijuana growing in
a fifteen by twenty-five foot plot in respondent's backyard was within the
curtilage); United States v. Depew, 8 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that
an area six feet from a garage and fifty to sixty feet from the house was within
the curtilage); Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968)
(holding that a stockpile of Christmas trees twenty to thirty-five feet from a
lodge and about five feet from a parking area of the lodge was within the
curtilage of the lodge).
314. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177 (holding government's intrusion upon the
open fields is not one of those 'unreasonable searches' proscribed by the text
of the Fourth Amendment). But see People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593
N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992) (holding that the expectation of
privacy, if overtly manifested and reasonable by objective societal standards,
can defeat the open fields exception to the warrant requirement with regard to
searches and seizures).
315. Saurini, 201 A.D.2d at 870, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
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found that the marijuana was growing outside the curtilage, it is
likely that it would have held the warrantless entry onto
defendant's property to be in violation of his constitutional right
to privacy pursuant to the second of the two open fields doctrine
aspects, in light of the People v. Scott decision.3 16
With regard to the second aspect, the United States Supreme
Court has held that "the term 'open fields' may include any
unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage. An open
field need be neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used
in common speech."' 3 17 Thus, the erection of a fence does not
necessarily defeat the open fields doctrine. 3 18 The New York
Court of Appeals, on the other hand, has expressly declined to
adopt this position. Rather, in People v. Scott,3 19 the court relied
on the expectation of privacy test formulated in Katz v. United
States320 and held that "where landowners fence or post 'No
Trespassing' signs on their private property or, by some other
means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not permitted, the
316. 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992). In
deciding not to follow the Supreme Court's holding in Oliver, the court of
appeals stated:
We believe that under the law of this State the citizens are entitled to
more protection. A constitutional rule which permits State agents to
invade private lands for no reason at all - without permission and in
outright disregard of the owner's efforts to maintain privacy by fencing
or posting signs -- is one that we cannot accept as adequately preserving
fundamental rights of New York citizens.
Id. at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
317. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.ll.
318. Id. at 177.
319. 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
320. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz, he
suggested that the expectation of privacy factor should be analyzed in two
steps: I) whether the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy,
and 2) whether such expectation would be viewed as objectively reasonable by
society. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The significance of this case, is
that in defining "expectation of privacy," it laid the foundation for viewing the
Fourth Amendment as essentially protecting "people, not places." Id. at 351.
See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) ("The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 'constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy.'" (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at
360)).
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expectation that their privacy rights will be respected and that
they will be free from unwanted intrusions is reasonable." 321
Thus, under New York State law, even property outside the
curtilage may be subject to the "unreasonable search"
proscription of article I, section 12 of the New York State
Constitution.322
In summary, neither the plain view doctrine nor the open fields
doctrine could justify the warrantless seizure of the defendant's
marijuana plants. The plain view doctrine essentially augments an
existing justification, permitting the seizure of an object where a
search was originally justified. A plain view seizure will be
justified if the seized object is viewed in plain sight from a lawful
vantage point, its incriminating nature is immediately apparent,
and the law enforcement official has some other lawful basis for
being in a position from which it can be seized. 323
The open fields doctrine defines an area of law in which law
enforcement officials may enter, without a warrant; an area that
is essentially outside the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. 324 The
state and federal case law differ as to whether efforts indicative
of an expectation of privacy impact the identification of an open
field. In this case, however, the plants were reasonably within the
curtilage325 and, therefore, not subject to either jurisdiction's
application of the open fields doctrine.
321. People v. Scott. 79 N.Y.2d 474, 491, 593 N.E.2d 1328. 1338. 583
N.Y.S.2d 920, 930 (1992).
322. Id. at 478. 593 N.E.2d at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922 ("[W]e hold that
the Oliver ruling does not adequately protect fundamental constitutional
rights... and we decline to follow it.").
323. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136-37 (1993): People
v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 110, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940, 943
(1993).
324. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) ("ITIhe special
protection accorded by the Fourth.Amendment to the people in their 'persons,
houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields.").
325. Saurini, 201 A.D.2d at 870, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
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